Click.THE SEARCH FOR THE PERFECT SEARCH ENGINE.
The decision to access the database was made by
then-Associate Attorney General John Schmidt, who overruled a subordinate when
the case arose in 1995 and defended his judgment in an interview Wednesday. Reno
had disqualified herself, telling aides in a memo not to contact her in the case
because "a close personal friend" was involved.
Rebekah Poston, an acquaintance of Reno's, sought arrest
records on a Japanese religious leader on behalf of a client. While Poston
successfully worked around the normal practice, she didn't get the answer she
wanted: She was informed there were no records on the individual.
Poston apparently was not the friend referred to in Reno's
recusal, although it may have been a lawyer in the same firm.
House Government Reform Committee investigators, examining
whether Poston received favored treatment, also questioned in an internal memo
whether private investigators working for Poston broke the law by
surreptitiously obtaining information from the database.
The private investigators told Poston they initially
learned there was an entry about the religious leader but speculated that it was
deleted following their inquiries.
Justice Department chief spokesman Myron Marlin confirmed
that Reno and Poston worked for the same Miami law firm, Steel Hector &
Davis, but said they were employed there at different times. He also confirmed
that Poston's sister, Roberta Forrest, worked on Reno's successful campaign as
Florida state attorney for Dade County.
"We have a practice of not providing
information" from the database, Marlin said. "In this case, we
believed it was appropriate to clear a person's name by indicating we had no
criminal record on him."
Schmidt was associate attorney general and the
third-ranking Justice Department official in 1995. He said he recalls the 1995
decision but does not remember Poston.
Schmidt overruled the department's freedom of information
official, who initially turned Poston down because of the policy of neither
confirming nor denying information from the National Crime Information Center
database.
Now a private attorney in Chicago, Schmidt said in an
interview, "I talked with anybody who wanted to complain about decisions
made within parts of the Justice Department that were my responsibility.
"In this case we had no records. I concluded it made
sense to disclose that and put the matter to rest, and avoid the need to
litigate. I made exceptions in particular cases that did not undermine the
policy."
Several attempts to reach Poston's lawyers were
unsuccessful. Government Reform Committee investigators, speaking only on
condition of anonymity, said Poston told them that she believed the department
changed its practice in this case because of her strong legal arguments. She
pointed out, correctly, that federal privacy law does not apply to foreign
nationals.
She declined to discuss the work of the private
investigators, the committee sources said.
Billing records indicate Poston was hired in 1994 by the
Japanese Buddhist sect Soka Gakkai to obtain criminal justice records on Nobuo
Abe, who led a rival Buddhist sect called Nichiren Shoshu. The lawyer was trying
to confirm an account that Abe was once arrested in Seattle in 1963 -
information that never was confirmed.
Straightforward
Work on Tough Case. But judge managed to include some surprises. The greatest among them may have been what Walker did not
do. The judge did not upend a deal that at times seemed likely
to topple under the relentless forces of political opposition, legal blunders
and ``horse trading,'' the phrase used in testimony to describe suspended
Examiner publisher Timothy O. White's attempts to elicit Mayor Willie Brown's
support for the deal. Ultimately, the judge, who as a lawyer defended
corporations in antitrust lawsuits, took a remarkably straightforward and
legally workmanlike approach to a complex case that broke new ground in
antitrust law. ``This case was a first in so many ways,'' said San
Francisco attorney Jesse Markham, an expert in antitrust law. ``It's easy to
overlook what that guy (Walker) had on his shoulders.'' Walker acknowledged the difficulty of his task by noting
in his opinion that ``precedent is scanty'' in the law governing newspaper
mergers. In essence, though, he decided that the sale of The
Chronicle to Hearst would not create an illegal monopoly or reduce competition
because ``the Examiner is a failing company'' whose demise would actually be
``economically efficient and otherwise in the public interest.''
But his path to that conclusion took some surprising
twists. Many antitrust experts expected the judge to rest his
decision on an analysis showing that a Hearst- owned Chronicle could not
monopolize a geographical area teaming with competing Web sites, radio and
television stations and other newspapers. And at first, Walker's opinion seemed ready to do just
that. ``The presence and importance of non-newspaper media in
the market for information has exploded,'' Walker wrote. But competition from
weekly and daily newspapers is also strong: ``Perhaps most significantly . . .
the San Jose Mercury- News poses a serious challenge to the market share of the
San Francisco-based metropolitan dailies.'' But Walker then abruptly dropped that line of reasoning
and based his approval of The Chronicle sale on an unorthodox interpretation of
the so-called failing company defense. Since 1965, The Chronicle and Examiner have operated under
a joint operating agreement, an exemption from antitrust laws that allows the
papers to combine printing and other business operations and to share profits
while maintaining editorial independence.
To dissolve the agreement and purchase The Chronicle, the
judge said, Hearst had to show that the Examiner was a failing company, unable
to survive outside the joint operating agreement. The judge concluded that
Hearst was able to prove that the Examiner was failing by using financial
projections and other evidence. But his interpretation raises several questions, say legal
experts. First, the failing-company defense has only been used when
the failing company is the one that is being acquired. In this case, the company
that is being acquired -- The Chronicle -- is not failing. Second, the Examiner is also clearly not failing when
evaluated with its most valuable asset -- the 50 percent share of assets and
profits under the joint operating agreement. ``To me,'' said Markham, ``the Examiner was never a
failing company until Hearst wanted to buy The Chronicle. I've never seen the
failing-firm defense used by a company that is not even thinking of going out of
business until it wanted to buy its competitor.'' Walker's opinion was also surprisingly critical of the
U.S. Justice Department. The judge was particularly harsh in characterizing the
department's apparent view that Hearst should offer the Examiner for sale with
its share of the joint operating agreement. He called that view ``inexplicable'' and its ``failure to
provide legal analysis'' for supporting the Fang transaction ``similarly
glaring.'' He even implied that the Justice Department took its
position as the result of political pressure from Mayor Brown and other San
Francisco politicians, rather than as a result of legal analysis. ``The undersigned is astonished and disappointed that DOJ
would allow itself to be put in a position where the inference can be so easily
drawn that its action or inaction in this case was political favoritism
masquerading as law enforcement.'' But legal experts say the Justice Department simply might
have disagreed with Walker's failing-company analysis and believed that the
Examiner -- with its share of the joint operating agreement -- was far from
failing. ``I can understand how the court drew the inferences it
did,'' said an attorney involved early on in the Justice Department's
discussions of the case. ``But at end of the day, once you end up with two
different companies owning two newspapers, that's competition. And the fact is
that the department didn't challenge a merger that the court upheld.''
Walker's final surprise involved his disapproving view of
the Examiner's transfer to the Fangs. Although it appeared that the transaction
would preserve competition by allowing a doomed newspaper to survive, Walker
found that the deal -- under which Hearst would essentially give the Examiner to
the Fangs, along with up to $66 million over three years -- was actually an
impediment to competition. He said the $66 million subsidy ``would appear to create a
barrier to entry by non- subsidized competitors . . . by infusing that paper
with cash untethered to performance.'' In a parting twist, though, Walker concluded that Reilly,
as a Chronicle subscriber and occasional purchaser of the Examiner, did not have
standing to challenge the Fang deal. And so the judge was able to say only that
the transaction ``could constitute a violation of the antitrust laws'' and let
the deal stand.
``Hearst has no economic reason or justification for the March 16 contract
(to transfer ownership of the Examiner to the Fangs) except its belief that this
transaction was necessary to shake loose political and regulatory approval of
the August 6 transaction (sale of The Chronicle to Hearst).'' ``On the merits of the deal, the evidence is clear: the Fang transaction is
grossly inefficient and probably anticompetitive. Hearst's proposed subsidy
would appear to create a barrier to entry by nonsubsidized competitors of the
contemplated Examiner by infusing that paper with cash untethered to
performance. Presence of an artificially strong Examiner in the market for daily
and weekly newspapers with a San Francisco focus would impair the ability of
established participants to compete in that localized market. Furthermore,
Hearst undoubtedly will attempt to recover the subsidy it is obligated to pay
the Fang group through higher advertising rates in the Chronicle. With these
facts, a persuasive case might be made that the March 16 transaction violates
the antitrust laws. But this conclusion cannot be predicated on the record of
the present proceedings, and the court is presently unable to do more than
identify the malodorous aspects of the Fang transaction.'' ``The court is deeply troubled by DOJ's role in this case. Both of DOJ's key
positions, that the Hearst/Chronicle merger created antitrust concerns and that
the Fang transaction resolved those concerns, are unsupported by legal analysis
and inconsistent with the evidence. DOJ has avoided explaining its apparent
departure from its own approach in earlier JOA investigations, the legal basis
for a burdensome and protracted investigation or the sudden approval of the
Chronicle acquisition after Hearst agreed to provide a heavily-subsidized
Examiner to political allies of the mayor of San Francisco. These observations lead the court to the uneasy inference that the cronyism
that fueled the Fang transaction at the local level also exerted influence over
the DOJ investigation. At the very least, DOJ's sanction of the Fang transaction
and the timing of that sanction, the now-abandoned characterization of the
proposed Fang publication as ``fully competitive'' and DOJ's unwillingness to
offer a legal analysis in support of its position significantly erodes the
court's confidence in the impartiality and probity of DOJ's review of the
transactions at bar. Hearst attributes the conduct of DOJ's investigation to
lack of knowledge and inexperience in the newspaper industry of the DOJ
personnel reviewing the transaction. While that explanation is troubling enough,
less forgiving explanations come easily to mind. The undersigned is astonished
and disappointed that DOJ would allow itself to be put in a position where the
inference can be so easily drawn that its action or inaction in this case was
political favoritism masquerading as law enforcement.'' ``The arrangements between Hearst and ExIn (the Fang family) contemplated in
the March 16 contract appear inimical to competition and could constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws. . . . Closure of the Examiner may proceed
without a sale to the Fang group or any other party unwilling to pay at least
liquidation value for Examiner assets.''
E-mail Reynolds Holding at holdingr@sfgate.com.
by Reynolds Holding © 2000, San Francisco Examiner.
The outcome of Clint Reilly's lawsuit challenging
the sale of The Chronicle to the Hearst Corp. prompted more speculation than
George W. Bush's vice-presidential choice -- and still the famously
unpredictable Judge Vaughn Walker managed a few surprises.SOME SURPRISING TWISTS
DISSOLVING THE JOA
DISAPPROVED OF FANG DEAL
EXCERPTS FROM JUDGE WALKER'S RULING
``HORSE TRADING''
``(George) Irish (president of Hearst's newspaper division) and (Hearst CEO
Frank) Bennack were aware of (Examiner Publisher Tim) White's overtures to
`horse trade` favorable editorial coverage in exchange for (Mayor Willie)
Brown's support of Hearst's Chronicle acquisition at the time, or shortly after,
White made them. In their testimony, Irish and Bennack denied knowing of White's
overtures to Brown until White testified about them in trial on May 1, 2000.
These denials are not credible and the court does not believe them. . . . The
demeanor of Bennack and Irish on the witness stand suggests that their testimony
in this regard was not forthright -- this is particularly true of Irish, who
simply was not a believable witness in this aspect of his testimony.''
THE FANG TRANSACTION
AN ANTICOMPETITIVE DEAL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CLOSING THE EXAMINER
The unsolvable problem is the near-impossibility of having a single engine
that could perform all types of searches. Sure, hybrid engines could be used,
rather as happens with metasearch engines like ProFusion. This combines
results from searches with a chosen set of engines. But the reality is that
with several fundamentally different methods of searching being available (and
needed), no single engine could be optimised for all searches.
Keyword searching was the first way of finding information and is still
perhaps the most important, but the relevance is often low, even if search
terms are truncated or logical operators are used (including nearness). The
daddy of all these engines was Dialog, which was developed at Lockheed in the
early 1960s as part of a NASA contract. Dialog passed first to Knight Ridder
and then to MAID in a highly-leveraged buyout, followed by a fire sale to the
Thompson Organisation. Its primary use was for bibliographical reference
searching, later extended to full text. Engines like Alta Vista are latter-day
derivatives, with some bells like translation as well as some missing whistles
like code categories. In many ways, keyword engines have their origins in the
likes of card indexes, and as we shall see, there's nothing new under the
search engine sun.
A long way to go
There has been little progress with semantic engines that parse text, because
this is a very difficult thing to do successfully. The problems include the
context, and the variety of idiom. Progress has been made in speech
recognition and automatic translation engines, and a convergence with search
engines is just beginning to be discernable. For an analogy of the present
situation, think back to the days of dot matrix printers, daisy wheel
printers, and the like: the progress yet to be made in the search/speech
recognition/translation convergence is like the shift to laser printing. It's
a big leap, but it will happen - although just as there will be small,
portable inkjet printers into the foreseeable future, so there will remain a
split into text search engines and concept searching engines.
Some search engines allow advertisers or fee payers to have their pages
displayed preferentially. Engines like Alta Vista use logical operators (also
known incorrectly as Boolean operators) which many users do not fully exploit.
The latest rage is for XML search engines that can find content marked up with
XML, such as GoXML.com.
Google uses what it calls PageRank to sequence the results of searches, and is
applying for a patent for this. It's all based on the number of links to a
particular page, which is weighted by the rank of the linking page. Even with
Google's 1.06 billion indexed pages, many no longer exist on the site, so the
cached version that Google offers is often a blessing for the searcher, and of
course a curse for the page creator if it has been removed because of an
error. The ideas are similar to those first used many years earlier in Science
Citation Index and its ilk.
San Francisco-based Alexa is highly regarded by its users, while Cambridge,
UK-based Autonomy has a similar active Web product called Kenjin, which was
released about four months ago - free, but Windows only. It analyses concepts
in an active window, gives links to more relevant information, and can sift
through local content on disk. Kenjin means wise man in Japanese, but at the
moment it's more of a wise boy, since it still has some tricks to learn.
How clever is Autonomy?
Autonomy - founded by Mike Lynch and now worth around $5 billion - has
achieved renown for its concept matching capability, which is certainly
workmanlike, but the success of the company derives more from a solid approach
to productisation and marketing. So far Autonomy has encountered little
competition, but its technology is not exactly space-age: it is more
historically based. The company has what it rather grandly describes as
"intellectual foundations". One of these is Bayesian Analysis, which
is used to work out probability relationships, and that's been around since
the Reverend Thomas Bayes of Tunbridge Wells wrote a pioneering paper about
statistical inference in 1763 (it was published posthumously, as he died in
1761).
The other credit is to electrical engineer Claude Shannon, who had an
essentially two-bit idea in 1949 that information can be quantified, and that
the information content of a word or phrase is inversely proportional to its
frequency of occurrence - and that's about it, because the theory doesn't get
you much further.
Although few people have probably realised it yet, the convergence we
mentioned results from Markov chains and transition probability matrices that
are used nowadays in speech recognition engines. These were first introduced
by Andrei Andeevich Markov, a Russian who went into self-imposed exile in 1905
and died in 1922. The theory is quite simple: in many cases, the probability
of an event depends only on the immediately preceding event (or events, if you
want to get more accurate and use second, third or greater orders). The events
could be the pronunciation of the syllables of a word or phrase in speech
recognition, or as an aid to concept analysis, for example.
There is too much hype, and too many extravagant claims are made by search
engine vendors. Search engines cannot be all things to all people, and it's a
matter of experience to know which is best for a particular requirement. Users
who rely on a few favoured Web sites, or just one Web engine, will not be
finding all that exists on the Web - or even just the best stuff.
Serious problems remain in Web site design: many Webmasters destroy the date
of the original creation of a document and replace it with an
automatically-generated date on which the page or site was last supposedly
updated. The original date is very valuable information for future searching,
to allow pages to be excluded or included.
There is a also a need for better indexing design if we're to be able to find
things on the Web, but the principles for defining the guidelines should come
from information science, rather than from nerd-lore. ®